
Semantics, Validation and Verification of DSLs: An Experience Report

Jozef Hooman, ESI by TNO and RU Nijmegen Sarmen Keshishzadeh, TU Eindhoven, Mohammad Mousavi, Halmstad University, Arjan Mooij, ESI by TNO




How to pigeonhole me


- 2001-2005: Ph.D., CS, TU Eindhoven with Jan Friso Groote and Gordon Plotkin (Title: Structuring SOS)
- 2006-2007: Postdoc with Luca Aceto
 (on unaxiomatizability theorems for process algebras)
- 2001-2013: ELE and CS, TU Eindhoven (semantics, process algebra, model checking, testing)
- 2013- : CERES, Halmstad University (model-based testing)
- **2014** Secretary of IFIP WG 1.8

Our Domain's Specifics

- Interventional X-ray scanners
- Several moving objects (tables, arms, detectors) and restrictions (e.g., on distances and velocities)
- Layered architecture: safety layer to prevent collisions
- Reacting to users' requests
- DSL for early validation, verification and code generation







Giving it a meaning

- Given a geometric model value (from sensors) and an input speed request (from user), calculate the set of active restrictions, and the output speed request
- Determining active restrictions depending on geometry and previous state
- Computing output speed requests based on input speed requests and most restrictive limits
- Integrating the semantics in a symbolic transition system

Validation and verification


- Model validation:
 - against domain-specific properties
 - coding the semantics and the properties in SMT input lang.
 - using Z3 to check for properties
- Implementation verification:
 - defining a notion of conformance
 - generating test-cases from models to check for conformance

Future roadmap

- Modularity in the semantics of the DSL
- Exploiting gray-box information for more effective testing
- Giving more specific feedback and automated debugging suggestions

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Structural Operational Semantics

- Semantical meta-theorems through syntactic conditions on SOS rules
- A yardstick for language designers
 (used for substantial languages such as CIF)
- Developed theory and tools for:
 - Compositionality (congruence) (overview: [TCS'07])
 - Algebraic properties (overview: [BEATCS'09])
 - Generating prototype implementations (animators, model-checkers) [SOS'05]
 - Axiomatizations and equivalence checkers [SOS'13]
- Modular semantics [CONCUR'13] and bisimulation for open systems [EXPRESS'10]

Model Checking

- Verifying epistmic properties of behavioral specifications [LPAR'07,TbiLLC'13]
- Exploiting symmetrical structures for verifying actor-based systems [Acta'10]
- Verifying sensor network protocols by identifying anti-patterns and avoiding them [iFM'12]

Model-Based Testing

- Applying conformance testing to industrial systems from:
 - healthcare [MoTIP'12,SEFM'13] and
 - financial [FSEN'07] domains.
- Extending conformance theories to cater for:
 - Asynchrony [SEFM'11, SoSym'14], and
 - Decompositional testing [MBT'13]
- Analyzing and reducing complexity of conformance checking [FACS'13]


Model-Based Testing (ongoing research)


- Applying conformance testing to software product lines (SPLs):
 - extending testing models and theories to SPLs [MBT'14] and
 - factoring out test-cases for common features [SAC-SVT'14]
- Model-based consequence analysis:
 - Analyzing the possible effects of non-conforming components in the overall system behavior, and
 - Diagnosing the system-level failures in terms of component faults

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Syntax by Example

```
// --- Context Declarations -----
object Table
object CArm
object Detector
model Actuals
                      predefined
model LookAhead
                      userdependent
// --- Restrictions -----
restriction ApproachingTableAndCArm
  activation
    Distance[Actuals](Table, CArm) < 35 mm + 15 cm
    absolute limit CArm[Rotation]
      at ((Distance[Actuals](Table, CArm) - 35 mm) / 15 cm) * 10 dgps
restriction ApproachingTableAndDetector
  activation
    Distance[LookAhead](Table, Detector) < 35 mm + 15 cm</pre>
 && Distance[LookAhead](Table, Detector) <
                                   Distance[Actuals](Table, Detector)
  effect
    relative limit Detector[Translation]
      at ((Distance[LookAhead](Table, Detector) - 35 mm) / 15 cm)
```

Geometric Model Values

$$GeoVal ::= Mod \rightarrow Dist$$

where *Dist* is the set of distance functions:

$$d: Obj \times Obj \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_0^+$$
 such that

- $-d(o_1,o_1)=0;$
- $-d(o_1,o_2)=d(o_2,o_1).$

Speed Requests

 $MovType == \{Rotation, Translation\}$

 $SpReq == Obj \times MovType \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^3$

Restrictions

R: Triples (act, deact, eff) such that

- $act, deact \in Cond$
- $eff \in \mathcal{P}(Eff)$

where

- $Cond == GeoVal \rightarrow Bool$, and
- Eff is the set of triples (lt, om, e) such that
 - $lt \in \{Abs, Rel\}$
 - $om \in \mathcal{P}(Obj \times MovType)$
 - $e \in Expr$

DSL Instance

A triple (Obj, Mod, R), where

- Obj is a given set of objects,
- Mod is a given set of geometric models, and
- R is a set of restrictions on Obj and Mod


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Active restruction

For a restriction r, a geometric model value g and a current activation state b:

$$CurrAct_r(b,g) = act_r(g) \lor (b \land \neg deact_r(g))$$



Determining active restruction set

ASTS(R) = (Q, q, T), where

- Q: R → Bool,
- q(r) = false, for each r in R,
- $T \subseteq Q \times Cond \times Q$, where
 - Cond: functions from geo. val. to Boolean expr., and
 - cond(g): conjunction of restrictions active w.r.t. g

Calculating the effect

For a **restriction r**, and a geometric model value g **the effect of r**, for each object o: the **most restrictive** absolute and relative **limits**

For a **set of restictions R** and a geometric model value g **the effect of R**, for each object o: the **most restrictive** absolute and relative **limits** for each and every active r in R, if any, or the set of real numbers, otherwise.

Output Request

Given the minimal (absoute and relative) limits, the output request is the speed vector respecting the limits.

Validation and verification

- Model validation:
 - against domain-specific properties
 - coding the semantics and the properties in SMT input lang.
 - using Z3 to check for properties
- Implementation verification:
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Validation

- Basic validation:
 - Syntax checking
 - Type checking
 - Reference chasing
- Advanced validation:
 - Range checking: relative limits in [0,1], non-negative distances
 - Safety
 - collision avoidance,
 - monotonicity: the closer the objects, the more restrictive the limits
 - Deadlock freedom: some user input takes us out of standstill


Automated debugging


- Pivotal restriction(s): the minimal set of restrictions violating the property
- Delta-debugging:
 - Take two sets of passing (R+) and failing (R-) restrictions, such that R- is smaller than of R+,
 - Pick some R in between R- and R+,
 - Validate R (using an SMT solver)
 - If R fails, let R- be R,
 if R passes, let R+ be R,
 repeat until R+ and R- differ in one restriction

Challenges

- Growing set of geometric functions used by the domain experts
- Masked restrictions
- Technical challenges in translation and SMT solving (non-linear constraints, quantification)

Masked restrictions





Results

- On an actual model:
 - 16 parameters,
 - 81 restrictions,
 - 264 properties (5 patterns)
- 226 violations detected,
- traced back to a handful restrictions
- Took 2 minutes

```
restriction ApproachingTableAndCArm
activation
Distance[Actuals](Table, CArm) < 35 mm + 15 cm
effect
absolute limit CArm[Rotation]
at ((Distance[Actuals](Table, CArm) - 35 mm) / 15 cm) * 10 dgps

Multiple markers at this line
- Potential (Rotation) deadlock for CArm
- Absolute limit for CArm rotation should be non-negative
```

Traces and runs

Run: $q_0(g_1,ur_1,or_1)\dots(g_n,ur_n,or_n)q_n$ such that

$$(q_0 = q) \land \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \ . \ (or_i = \llbracket output_R \rrbracket_{L(q_i)}(g_i, ur_i)) \land (\exists cond \in Cond.(q_{i-1}, cond, q_i) \in T \land cond(g_i))$$

Trace: any finite prefix of a run

Conformance

Testing assumption: **implementation** behaves as an **unknown ASTS**

Goal: to establish whether the **implementation** is **(trace) equivalent** to the **DSL instance**

Means: generate **covering test-cases** (concrete executions) from the DSL

Coverage

The two notions of coverage:

- For each reachable symbolic state, an execution hits the state (generic, similar to node coverage)
- For each reachable state, and each reachable limit, an execution checks for its enforcement (domain-specific)

Future roadmap

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Key references

- A.J. Mooij, J. Hooman, R. Albers: Early Fault Detection Using Design Models for Collision Prevention in Medical Equipment. FHIES 2013.
- S. Keshishzadeh, A.J. Mooij, MRM: Early Fault Detection in DSLs Using SMT Solving and Automated Debugging. SEFM 2013.